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On Some Distributed Disorder Detection∗
Krzysztof Szajowski†
Abstract Multivariate data sources with components of different information value
seem to appear frequently in practice. Models in which the components change their
homogeneity at different times are of significant importance. The fact whether any
changes are influential for the whole process is determined not only by the moments
of the change, but also depends on which coordinates. This is particularly important
in issues such as reliability analysis of complex systems and the location of an in-
truder in surveillance systems. In this paper we developed a mathematical model
for such sources of signals with discrete time having the Markov property given
the times of change. The research also comprises a multivariate detection of the
transition probabilities changes at certain sensitivity level in the multidimensional
process. Additionally, the observation of the random vector is depicted. Each chosen
coordinate forms the Markov process with different transition probabilities before
and after some unknown moment. The aim of statisticians is to estimate the mo-
ments based on the observation of the process. The Bayesian approach is used with
the risk function depending on measure of chance of a false alarm and some cost of
overestimation. The moment of the system’s disorder is determined by the detection
of transition probabilities changes at some coordinates. The overall modeling of the
critical coordinates is based on the simple game.
Key words: change-point problems, false alarm, overestimation, sequential detec-
tion, simple game, voting stopping rule
1 Introduction
The aim of the study is to investigate the mathematical model of a multivariate
surveillance system introduced in [17]. in the model there is net N of p nodes. At
each node the state is the signal at moment n ∈N which is at least one coordinate of
the vector −→x n ∈ E⊂ ℜm. The distribution of the signal at each node has two forms
that depend on the state of surrounding. The state of the system changes dynami-
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cally. We consider the discrete time signal observed as m ≥ p dimensional process
on the probability space (Ω ,F ,P). The Markov processes, which are observed at
each node, are non homogeneous with two homogeneous segments as they have dif-
ferent transition probabilities (see [12] for details). The visual consequence of the
transition distribution changes at moment θi, i ∈N is a change of its character. In
order to avoid false alarm the confirmation from other nodes is needed. The fam-
ily of subsets (coalitions) of nodes is defined in such a way that the decision of all
members of a given coalition is equivalent to the claim that the disorder appeared
in the net. It is not certain, however that the disorder has taken place. The aim is to
define the rules of nodes and a construction of the net decision based on individual
nodes claims. Various approaches can be found in the recent research that refer to
the description of such systems (see e.g. [19], [11]). The problem is quite similar to
a pattern recognition with multiple algorithm when the results of fusions of individ-
ual algorithms are unified to a final decision. In the study two different approaches
are proposed. Both are based on the simple game defined on the nodes. The naive
methods determine the system disordering by fusion individual node strategies. This
construction of the individual decisions is based on the observation at each node
separately.
The advanced solution of Bayesian version of the multivariate detection with
a common fusion center is based on a stopping game defined by a simple game
related to the observed signals. The individual decisions are based the analysis of
the processes observed at all nodes and knowledge of nodes’ interaction (the simple
game). The sensors’ strategies are constructed as an equilibrium strategy in a non-
cooperative stopping game with a logical function defined by a simple game (which
aggregates their decision).
The general description of such multivariate stopping games has been formu-
lated by Kurano, Yasuda and Nakagami in the case when the aggregation function
is defined by the voting majority rule [5] and the observed sequences of the random
variables are independent, identically distributed. It was Ferguson [3] who substi-
tuted the voting aggregation rules by a simple game. The Markov sequences have
been investigated by the author and Yasuda [16].
The model of detection of the disorders at each sensor is presented in the next
section. It allows to define the individual payoffs of the players (sensors). The final
decision based on the state of the sensors is given by the fusion center and it is
described in Section 5. The natural direction of further research is formulated in the
same section.
2 Detection of disorder at sensors
Following the consideration presented in Section 1, let us suppose that the process
{
−→X n,n ∈ N}, N = {0,1,2, . . .}, is observed sequentially in such a way that each
sensor, e.g. rth one gets its coordinates in the vector −→X n at moment n. By assump-
tion, it is a stochastic sequence that has the Markovian structure which is given
random moment θr in such a way that the process after θr starts from state −→X θr−1.
The objective is to detect these moments based on the observation of −→X n at each
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sensor separately. There are some results on the discrete time case of such disorder
detection which generalize the basic problem stated by Shiryaev in [13] (see e.g.
Brodsky and Darkhovsky [2], Bojdecki [1]) in various directions. In the early pa-
pers the observed sequence has independent elements given disorder moment. The
sequences with dependent observations are subject of investigation by Yoshida [21],
Szajowski [15], Yakir [20], Moustakides [7] and Mei [6].
The application of the model for the detection of traffic anomalies in networks
was discussed by Tartakovsky et al. [18]. The version of the problem when the
moment of disorder is detected with given precision will be used here (see [12]).
2.1 Formulation of the problem
The observable random variables {−→X n}n∈N are consistent with the filtration Fn (or
Fn = σ(
−→X 0,
−→X 1, . . . ,
−→X n)). The random vectors −→X n take values in (E,B), where
E ⊂ ℜm. On the same probability space there are defined unobservable (hence not
measurable with respect to Fn) random variables {θr}mr=1 which have the following
geometric distributions:
P(θr = j) = pirI{ j=0}( j)+ (1− I{ j=0}( j))(1−pir)p j−1r qr,
where pir,qr = 1− pr ∈ (0,1), j = 0,1,2, . . ..
The sensor r follows the process which is based on switching between two, time
homogeneous and independent the Markov processes {X irn}n∈N, i = 0,1, r ∈N with
the state space (E,B). These are both independent of {θr}mr=1. Moreover, the pro-
cesses {X irn}n∈N have transition densities
Pix(X ir1 ∈ B) = P(X ir1 ∈ B|X ir0 = x) =
∫
B
f rix (y)µ(dy).
The random processes {Xrn}, {X0rn}, {X1rn} and the random variables θr are con-
nected via the rule: Xrn = X0rnI{n:n<k}(n) + X1r n+1−kI{n:n≤k}(n) on θr = k, where
{X1rn} starts from X0r k−1 (but is otherwise independent of X0r ·).
For any x ∈ E, pir ∈ [0,1], c ∈ ℜ+ and τr ∈ SX , where SX denotes the set of
all stopping times with respect to the filtration {Fn}n∈N, the risk associated with
τr is defined as follows ρr(x,pir,τr) = Px pir(τr < θr)+ cEx pir max{τr −θr,0},where
Px pir(τr < θr) is the probability of false alarm and Ex pir max{τr −θr,0} is the aver-
age delay of detecting correctly the occurrence of disruption.
Every sensor is looking for the stopping time τ∗r ∈ SX such that for every
(x ;pir) ∈ E× [0,1]
ρ⋆(x,pir) = ρr(x,pir,τ⋆r ) = inf
τr∈SX
ρr(x,pir,τr). (1)
2.2 The optimal detection problem as an optimal stopping problem
In case of the independent sequence given the disorder moment the construction of
τ∗ through the transformation of the problem to the optimal stopping problem for
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the Markov process (Xn,Π pirr n) can be made where Π pirr n is the posterior process (see
e.g. [14]). It is stated that Π pirr0 = pir, Π pirrn = Ppir (θr ≤ n |Fn), for n = 1,2, . . ., is
designed as information about the distribution of the disorder instant θr. Moreover,
ρr(x,pir,τr) = Ex,pir
{
(1−Π pirrτr)+ c
τr−1∑
k=0
Π pirr k
}
. (2)
The family of the Markov random functions {Π pir ,pir ∈ [0,1]} can be associated
with a Markov process with discrete time Π = (pin,Fn,Ppir), for n ≥ 0, having the
same transition probabilities as each Markov random function is presented as Π pir ,
pir ∈ [0,1].
2.3 The optimal stopping problem with observation costs
The problem of minimization of the risk (2) can be solved as the special optimal
stopping problem. As it is shown in [10], p.22-23, the problem can be transformed to
the optimal stopping problem for the time-homogeneous two dimensional Markov
chain without observation costs. The Wald-Bellman equation which solves (1) takes
the form:
ρ⋆(x,pir) = min{1−pir,cpir +Ex,pir ρ⋆(x1,pi1)}. (3)
3 The aggregated decision via the cooperative game
There are various methods combining the decisions of several classifiers or sensors.
The methods based on winning coalitions in the simple game presented in [17] will
be used. The obvious changes are the consequence that in the model considered
now the aim is to minimize the risk. We apply two methods of decision aggregation.
In the first one, based on the optimal disorder detection strategies, we apply the
aggregation method. This approach does not guarantee that the obtained system
disorder detection will have certain stability or equilibrium properties.
In the second approach each ensemble member contributes to some degree to the
decision at any point of the sequentially delivered states. The fusion algorithm takes
into account all the decision outputs from each ensemble member and comes up
with an ensemble decision in such a way that the solution is an equilibrium point in
an antagonistic, no-zero sum game.
3.1 A simple game
Let us assume that there are many nodes which absorb information and make de-
cisions if the disorder has appeared or not. The final decision is made in the fusion
center which aggregates the information from all sensors.
The voting decision is made according to the rules of a simple game. Let us recall
that a coalition is a subset of the players. Let C = {C : C⊂N} denote the class of all
coalitions. A simple game (see [9], [3]) is a coalition game having the characteristic
function of φ(·) : C → {0,1}.
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Let us denote W = {C ⊂ N : φ(C) = 1} and L = {C ⊂ N : φ(C) = 0}. The
coalitions in W are called the winning coalitions, and those from L are called the
losing coalitions. By assumption, the characteristic function satisfies the properties:
N ∈W ; /0 ∈L ; (the monotonicity): T ⊂ S ∈L implies T ∈L .
3.2 The aggregated decision rule
When the simple game is defined and the players can vote presence or absence,
xi = 1 or xi = 0, i ∈N of the local disorder then the aggregated decision is given by
the logical function
δ (x1,x2, . . . ,xp) = ∑
C∈W
∏
i∈C
xi ∏
i/∈C
(1− xi). (4)
For the logical function δ we have (cf [5])
δ (x1, . . . ,xp) = xi ·δ (x1, . . . ,
i
˘1, . . . ,xp)+ xi ·δ (x1, . . . ,
i
˘0, . . . ,xp).
3.3 Aggregated sensors strategies
For any stopping times {τi}pi=1 with respect of the filtration {Fn}n∈N we have the
representation by the individual stopping strategies σ in(τ) = I{ω:τi≥n}. The aggregate
function applied to the individual stopping times will construct the detection strategy
σn of the system disorder. The stopping time from the individual stopping strategy
is constructed as τ = inf{0≤ n ≤ N : σn ∏n−1k=1(1−σk) = 1}.
This aggregation method is the basement of both constructions. In the naive al-
gorithm it is applied to the optimal individual strategies of the sensors constructed
as the solution of the optimal stopping problem (1).
In the multivariate stopping game approach the aggregation of the individual
decision is used to construct the set of admissible strategies. The details are the
subject of the next section.
4 A non-cooperative detection problem
Following the results of the author and Yasuda [16] the multilateral stopping of a
Markov chain problem can be described in the terms of the notation used in the
non-cooperative game theory (see [8], [9]). This approach can be applied to the
distributed disorder detection by reformulation of the problem to the multilateral
stopping problem. The important issue is the representation of the expected risk in
the disorder detection problem for one sensor given in (2).
Let us denote σ i = (σ i1, . . . ,σ iN) and let Si be the set of ISSs of player i, i =
1,2, . . . , p (see [5]). Define S=S1× . . .×Sp the set of the stopping strategy (SS).
The factual stopping of the observation process (the estimate of the system disorder
moment), and the players realization of the payoffs are defined by the stopping
strategy exploiting p-variate logical function δ : {0,1}p → {0,1}. Since δ is fixed
during the analysis we write t(σ) = tδ (σ).
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We have {ω ∈ Ω : tδ (σ) = n}=
⋂n−1
k=1{ω ∈ Ω : δ (σ1k ,σ2k , . . . ,σ
p
k ) = 0}∩{ω ∈
Ω : δ (σ1n ,σ2n , . . . ,σ pn ) = 1} ∈ Fn, then the random variable tδ (σ) is the stopping
time with respect to {Fn}Nn=1. For any stopping time tδ (σ) and i ∈ {1,2, . . . , p}, let
ρi(Xtδ (σ),Πtδ (σ),δ (σ))= ρi(Xn,Πn,n)I{tδ (σ)=n}+ limsupn→∞ ρi(Xn,Πn,n)I{tδ (σ)=∞}.(cf [14], [16]). If players use SS σ ∈ S and the individual preferences are con-
verted to the effective stopping time by the aggregate rule δ , then player i gets
ρi(Xtδ (σ),Πtδ (σ)).
Let ∗σ = (∗σ1, . . . ,∗σ p)T ∈S and ∗σ(i) = (∗σ1, . . . ,∗σ i−1,σ i,∗σ i+1, . . . ,∗σ p)T .
Definition 1. (cf. [16]) For the fixed aggregate rule δ the strategy ∗σ ∈ S is an
equilibrium strategy if for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . , p} and any σ i ∈Si we have
ρi(x,pii, tδ (∗σ))≤ ρi(x,pii, tδ (∗σ(i))). (5)
The set S, the vector of the utility functions f = ( f1, f2, . . . , fp) and the mono-
tone rule δ define the non-cooperative game G = (S, f ,δ ). The construction of the
equilibrium strategy ∗σ ∈S in G is provided in [16]. In the case of the considered
distributed disorder detection problem we have fi(x,pi) = 1−pi .
With each ISS of player i the sequence of stopping events Din = {ω : σ in = 1}
is associated. For each aggregate rule δ there exists the corresponding set value
function ∆ : F→ F such that δ (σ1n , . . . ,σ pn ) = δ{ID1n , . . . ,IDpn } = I∆ (D1n,...,Dpn ). For
the solution of the considered game the important class of ISS and the stopping
events can be defined by subsets Ci ∈ B of the state space E. A given set Ci ∈ B
will be called the stopping set for player i at moment n if Din = {ω : Xn ∈ Ci} is the
stopping event.
Let gi be the real, integrable functions defined on E× [0,1] and Ci ∈ B. Let
iD1(A) = ∆(D11, . . . ,D
i−1
1 ,A,D
i+1
1 , . . . ,D
p
1). For fixed D
j
n = {ω : Xn ∈ Ci}, j =
1, . . . , p, j 6= i define ψ(Ci) = Ex
[
(1−Π i1)IiD1(Di1)+ gi(X1,Π1)IiD1(Di1)
]
.
Lemma 1. Let C j ∈B, j = 1,2, . . . , p, j 6= i, be fixed. Then the set ∗Ci = {x ∈ E :
ρi(x)− gi(x)≤ 0} ∈B is such that ψ(∗Ci) = inf
Ci∈B
ψ(Ci) and
ψ(∗Ci) = Ex,pi (1−Π i1− gi(X1,Π1))+IiD1( /0) (6)
−Ex,pi(1−Π i1− gi(X1,Π1))−IiD1(Ω)+Ex,pi gi(X1,Π1).
Based on Lemma 1 we derive the recursive formulae defining the equilibrium
point and the equilibrium payoff for the finite horizon detection problem.
4.1 The finite horizon detection problem
Let horizon N be finite and the equilibrium strategy ∗σ exist. We denote ρi,N(x,pi) =
Ex,pi ρi(Xt(∗σ),Πt(∗σ)) the equilibrium payoff of i-th player when X0 = x. Let Sin =
{{σ ik},k = n, . . . ,N} and Sn =S1n×S2n× . . .×S
p
n .
Denote tn = tn(σ) = t(nσ) = inf{n ≤ k ≤ N : δ (σ1k ,σ2k , . . . ,σ
p
k ) = 1} to be the
stopping time not earlier than n. Let ρi,N−n+1(Xn−1,Πn−1)= ρi(Xtn(∗σ),Πtn(∗σ), tn(∗σ)).
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At n = N we have ρi,0(x,pi) = ρi(x,pi ,N). Let us assume that the process is not
stopped up to moment n and the players are using the equilibrium strategies ∗σ ik,
i = 1,2, . . . , p, at k = n+1, . . . ,N. Choose player i and assume that other players are
using the equilibrium strategies ∗σ jn , j 6= i, and player i is using strategy σ in defined
by the stopping set Ci. Then the expected payoff ϕN−n(Xn−1,Ci) of player i in the
game starting at n, when the state of a Markov chain at n− 1 is Xn−1, is equal to
ϕN−n(Xn−1,Πn−1,Ci) = EXn−1,Πn−1
[
(1−Π in)Ii∗Dn(Din)+ρi,N−n(Xn,Πn)Ii∗Dn(Din)
]
,
where i∗Dn(A) = ∆(∗D1n, . . . ,∗Di−1n ,A,∗Di+1n , . . . ,∗D
p
n).
By Lemma 1 the conditional expected gain ϕN−n(XN−n,Ci) attains the maximum
on the stopping set ∗Cin = {x ∈ E : fi(x)− vi,N−n(x)≤ 0} and
vi,N−n+1 ( Xn−1,Πn−1)− ciΠ in−1 = Ex[(1−Π in− vi,N−n(Xn,Πn))+Ii∗Dn( /0)|Fn−1]
−Ex[(1−Π in− vi,N−n(Xn))−Ii∗Dn(Ω)|Fn−1]+Ex[vi,N−n(Xn,Πn)|Fn−1]
Px−a.e.. This reasoning allows to formulate the following construction of the equi-
librium strategy and the equilibrium value for the game G .
Theorem 1. In the game G with finite horizon N we have the following solution.
(i) The equilibrium value vi(x,pi), i = 1,2, . . . , p, of the game G can be calculated
recursively as follows: vi,0(x,pi) = 1−pii and for n = 1,2, . . . ,N, i = 1,2, . . . , p
we have Px−a.e.
vi,n(XN−n,ΠN−n) − ciΠ iN−n = Ex,pi [vi,n−1(XN−n+1,ΠN−n+1)|FN−n]
+ Ex,pi [(1−Π iN−n+1)− vi,n−1(XN−n+1),ΠN−n+1)+Ii∗DN−n+1(Ω)|FN−n]
− Ex,pi [((1−Π iN−n+1)− vi,n−1(XN−n+1,ΠN−n+1))−Ii∗DN−n+1( /0)|FN−n].
(ii) The equilibrium strategy ∗σ ∈S is defined by the SS of the players ∗σ in, where
∗σ in = 1 if Xn ∈ ∗Cin, and ∗Cin = {x ∈ E : fi(x)− vi,N−n(x)≤ 0}, n = 0,1, . . . ,N.
We have vi(x,pi) = vi,N(x,pi), and Ex,pi (1−Π it(∗σ)) = vi,N(x), i = 1,2, . . . , p.
5 Determining the strategies of sensors
Based on the model constructed in Sections 2–4 for the net of sensors with the fu-
sion center determined by a simple game, one can determine the rational decisions
of each nodes. The rationality of such a construction refers to the individual aspi-
ration for the highest sensitivity to detect the disorder without a false alarm. The
Nash equilibrium fulfills the requirement that nobody deviates from the equilibrium
strategy, otherwise its expected risk will be higher.
The proposed model disregards the correlation of the signals. It is also assumed
that the fusion center has complete information about the signals and that the in-
formation is available at each node. The method of a cooperative game was used
in [4] to find the best coalition of sensors in the problem of the target localization.
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The approach which is proposed in the study shows the possibility of modeling the
detection problem by multiple agents at a general level.
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